

## The Work of Imaginative Perception in Architectural Understanding

*“The experience of architecture is by no means the simple matter that it may appear to be”.<sup>1</sup>*

Although semiology attempted to bring a rational analytic approach to architectural meaning, it failed to account for how we perceive meaning in the actual experience of architecture since it failed to connect the signified from mental concept to the world. Phenomenology, while emphasizing the first-person experience of architecture in the world, failed to give an objective or communicable account of the meaning being perceived by the architectural subject. In this paper I will contend that there is a theory of architectural understanding that both achieves a broader framework from which to evaluate structuralist, phenomenological, and post-structuralist theories as well as provides a thread of continuity through them. This alternate theory relies on the idea of imaginative perception/experience, which is founded in both Kant’s philosophy and a Wittgensteinian theory of mind, action and meaning, resources unavailable to the non-philosopher.<sup>2</sup> This theory was introduced into the realm of architectural theory by the analytic philosopher Roger Scruton in his 1979 publication of *The Aesthetics of Architecture*. I will outline how this theory works and then describe how I feel it better describes our actual experience of architecture than either semiological or phenomenological theories of architecture. Indeed, many criticisms of semiology presented by post-structuralists are confirmed by this approach. It should be noted that this approach will not tell us how to build, but it will establish a framework by which we may better understand how architecture is perceived and also how architectural judgments can be articulated in the public sphere.

Roland Barthes, in his essay “Semiology and The Urban,” states that “Symbolism...is no longer conceived today...as a regular correspondence between signifiers and signified...the signifieds are like

mythical creatures, extremely imprecise, and at a certain point they always become the signifiers of something else...”<sup>3</sup> To use Derrida’s term, if it is the case that there is a *slippage* of meaning in how a building signifies, and that meaning cannot be objectively tied to its visual or formal content, then perhaps we should look in the direction of how we as subjects of architecture actually process the experience of architecture to derive the meaning we do from it. Perhaps a key to this slippage can be found in the way we actually experience architecture, or more accurately, what role we as subjects contribute to multiple readings inherent in any one work of architecture.


To begin with, we should make a distinction between ordinary perception and imaginative perception. When I visually see an object in front of me I perceive it. When I imagine something I am holding a form of a mental image in my mind. I don’t need to be looking at something to imagine it. It was Emmanuel Kant who first gave the name ‘imagination’ to the faculty that unites sensation and concept, a truth that has changed the entire course of modern philosophy. It is imagination that knits together the scattered data of the senses into a patterned whole.<sup>4</sup> In architectural experience, imagination is the faculty that imposes unity and order upon its object when a literal perception would only see fragments and disjointed architectural pieces. This is similar to seeing a face emerge from a series of pointillist dots in an Impressionist painting, or even to seeing an animal in a cloud formation. This fact is quite significant in our experience of architecture — what it implies is that although the work of architecture itself is the source of our sense (literal) perception (and if this were all there were to perception then everyone would experience architecture in the same way), that each person as they observe and walk through the architecture is imagining the building, that is creating a unified whole or pattern out of the individual bits of visual data received. The fact that our perceptual experience can be combined with propositional content means that our ideas, knowledge, training, and past experiences can all play into how we see these patterns form in our mind’s eye. And so, it is

true both that we can develop an acquired taste in architectural matters as well as bring judgments into discussion that can be communicated back in propositional content. Nevertheless, while the person receiving your propositional content of the building may learn information about the building they did not know beforehand, that is not the same thing as their having experienced the building first-hand.


Ludwig Wittgenstein said, "The concept of imaging is rather like one of doing than of receiving. Imagining might be called a creative act...if one says, 'Imagination has to do with the will then the same connection is meant as with the sentence, 'Imaging has nothing to do with observation.'"<sup>5</sup>

However, one may in fact combine imagination with perception as Wittgenstein subsequently points out. We can call this imaginative perception or imaginative experience. In the *Philosophical Investigations* (II Hxi) Wittgenstein uses the example of a picture of a triangle. The simple three-line drawing "can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawings; ...as a mountain, as a

wedge, as an arrow or pointer..."<sup>6</sup>



The question is raised, how does one see (perceive) this three-line figure both as the simple drawing it is and 'as' a mountain or 'as' an arrow, etc.? In another example (Ixi), Wittgenstein uses the example of the 'duck-rabbit',



How is it that the picture remains stable but our experience of it can switch between a rabbit and a duck? Similarly, when we look at a painting of a landscape, we perceive the paint strokes, but we bring the landscape into our minds through the imaginative sense.<sup>7</sup> The difference between imagination and imaginative experience is that imaginative experience is grounded in a present perception. It has an object and a duration that can be quantified. Take away the perception element and imaginative experience as an interpreted way of seeing, disappears.

So far we see that we have two essential concepts being considered. First is that we see that we can have a perception of something and at the same time hold an imaginative experience of that thing. Secondly, we can see how the 'aspect' of our imaginative perception can shift, even at will. It would not be impossible for someone to say to you to look for the duck aspect in the duck-rabbit figure and then after a brief duration to ask you to look for the rabbit aspect in the same image. Or, to use an architectural example, to say in regards to the Sydney Opera House to see how it appears like sails of ships and later to see the roof elements as turtle shells. Or even to 'see' it without using metaphorical imagery at all but to see the roof elements as incised geometric forms only. This shows the role that free will or voluntary action plays in imaginative experience.

With the above description of how perception and imagination work, some further definitions and groundwork should be made which will be useful to make some distinctions and comparisons with phenomenology and semiology later. A proposition is a structured thought and it can include beliefs, hopes, desires, intentions and knowledge.<sup>8</sup> Propositional thoughts are not intrinsically phenomenological and are open to be accessible to a third-party perspective (in other words, they can be communicated publicly). Sensations are phenomenological as they are only accessible to a first-person perspective. One cannot be said to have a wrong or incorrect sensation; however, one can have an incorrect proposition. Propositions carry truth content, as does language. Perceptions

can convey two types of mental phenomena, the sense data that is phenomenological and also objective data from the world, the means by which we gain knowledge of it, structure it, and form propositional attitudes of it. The phenomenological state is not subject to truth content; however, imaginative experience involves both phenomenology and propositional attitudes.<sup>9</sup> This is the key that will explain how it is our architectural experience is like the coin which has two sides to it for which neither semiology nor phenomenology alone can account. When we experience architecture it is not so much that we have certain thoughts about the building but that we 'see' the building in a certain way, an interpreted way, which effects the way the building looks to us. Scruton clarifies agreement on this point when he states, "There is a familiar point, made by both philosophers and psychologists that, in perception, experience and interpretation (or percept and concept) are inseparable. To say how my experience is, I must say how the world seems to me. And that is to use the concept of an objective world."<sup>10</sup>

As Ed Winters explains, "Objects in the world act upon us and arouse in us perceptual states that combine a phenomenological state and a propositional attitude. The objects are what we see but we apprehend the world as it intrudes on our senses by taking up an attitude toward a content structured by the observational concepts we have to hand. Thus our perceptions have something like a judgement."<sup>11</sup> And yet, the important point is also made that imaginative experience, unlike perception, is non-epistemic. We cannot learn anything about the world by analyzing our imagination (in distinction to the knowledge that our perceptions of the world bring to us). Due to the propositional aspect of this imaginative experience, the action of 'seeing' the building will take on a certain rational character so that one can give reasons for or against how a building might be properly understood. And as Scruton adds, "There is such a thing as accepting a reason through an experience; and the importance of this point must not be underestimated."<sup>12</sup> Scruton considers two

additional features to this theory that are important to grasp, first that there is never only one way to experience a building in its entirety and secondly that when we do experience architecture that we are active and not passive in the act. When we switch between certain ways of seeing a grouping of columns for instance, our aim is not knowledge but the “enjoyment of the appearance of a thing already known.”<sup>13</sup>

Separately, but in a parallel vein, the late philosopher of aesthetics, R.K. Elliott in his book *Aesthetics, Imagination, and the Unity of Experience*, gives an example of an observer of a certain painting: “The only solution is for Imagination to set the percipient free from his role as spectator, and enable him to experience the depicted movement in his own person, while at the same time preserving him in his spectatorial role in order that perception of the stimulating work shall be continuous. This is accomplished by the emergence of an imaginal self or ego which enters into the world of the work, most commonly by identifying itself with some depicted person.”<sup>14</sup> Architectural experience is both more encompassing than observing a painting (as the observer literally enters the structure and becomes part of its spatial content), and yet often less directed in that a picture might be telling a story of specific people at a snapshot in time that the observer can identify with. Below we will look at some architectural examples to clarify the above theory.

The previous discussion set up the framework for considering how the idea of imaginative experience works in principle. In this section I will give examples that further illustrate how this works in further support to the theory. R.K. Elliott gives several examples of imaginative experience at work in works of art and architecture. Describing this process at work in architecture, he uses St. Albans Cathedral as an example.



Here we see a Cathedral that has often been associated with the 'visual metaphor' of a living animal, namely as a recumbent lion that assumes a bodily posture, august and brooding. It's not that our perception of the building reconfigures the visual form of what we are looking at. We still see the stone as stone, the tower as a tower, the cathedral as a cathedral, etc. It is more as if a parallel aspect comes along side the actual image: "Since the cathedral seems to have received a self or life, it could be said paradoxically that an image of something invisible has come into contact with the visual impression."<sup>15</sup> This coincides with what Wittgenstein states in his *Philosophical Investigations* concerning the triangle figure mentioned above: "But how is it possible to 'see' an object according to an 'interpretation'?...as if something were being forced into a form it did not really fit. But no squeezing, no forcing took place here. When it looks as if there were no room for such a form between other ones you have to look for it in another dimension. If there is no room here, there is room in another

dimension.”<sup>16</sup> In other words, the thing imagined when perceiving an object doesn't replace or alter the perception of the object but it exists as a separate form of being in the mind than the sense perception itself.

Elliott makes another interesting observation in reference to Auguste Rodin's book "Cathedrals of France" where Rodin "tells us that he commonly saw the forest as a cathedral, and that in the cathedral the image of a forest imposed itself upon him. If we see a cathedral nave as a forest it is because, although the content of our visual impression scarcely changes, the noetic aspects of our perceiving approximate to those of our perception of the forest.”<sup>17</sup>



Consider the architectural effect that takes place on the facade of the Palazzo Pisani-Moretta.





In the upper central colonnade there is a complex geometric overlapping of tracery and arches. One can 'read' the arches as smaller pointed gothic arches spanning from one column to the next column. On the other hand, an equally valid reading could be taken by viewing a wider round arch that spans two columns (skipping a column).

In his essay, "Towards a New Architecture," as an example of pliant and folded architecture, Jeffrey Kipnis uses Eisenman's Columbus Convention center as a particular instance.



Kipnis discusses how, in Deleuzian fashion, the intent of this large urban building is to create “weak resemblances” so that it might enter into unexpected relationships, with effects that flow from the intrinsic formal, topological, or spatial character of the design,” and continues on to say that “all these aspects of the fold are related to architectural effects.”<sup>18</sup> When one observes this building, especially from a bird’s eye view, which is how it is often photographed, one can see how the play of imaginative experience has been deliberately encouraged, although neither Kipnis nor Eisenman refer to it by such a name. It is in fact Eisenman’s intentional design of these weak resemblances that give rise to a heightened play of imaginative experience in this work of architecture. If instead of the intended ‘weak’ resemblances, Eisenman had created a “strong” resemblance to either traditionally styled architecture or literal metaphors (as was done in much of Post Modernist architecture) then there would not be as great a degree of associative readings possible of the building, and less occasion for the “difference” or slippage of meaning than if it were more denotatively configured. To use semiotic terminology, this associative aspect represents the paradigmatic axis, the deconstructionists’

preferred (and inverted) side of Saussure's signification diagram. "Weak resemblances" are another way of describing ambiguity and it is here in the place of ambiguity that the imaginative perception can find many connections, either to the surrounding context or to connections in the memory of the observer and allows for a constant switching of aspect as we saw in Wittgenstein's diagram of the "duct-rabbit." Eisenman himself referred to the building in two different aspects: as a bundle of fiber-optics cable in cross section and as the train-track switching system that once occupied the site of the building. One who experiences this building may also draw visual connections between the older buildings across the street and the "ends" of the fibrils that seem to line up and have the same scale. Semantically speaking, there is not one "true" meaning to the building. One may, for example, assign the form of the building to the flow of the surrounding freeway system rather than to the historic trace of the train tracks once on the site. Whether or not Eisenman had intended this when he designed it would not alter the validity of such a comparison. All of this observation fits nicely into the framework of neo (post)-structuralism. But this is not the same thing as saying that any and all interpretations of the building are equally valid. It is not the case that I am experiencing this work of architecture in its phenomenological essence which is beyond the ability of language to convey back into the public sphere (and with it forfeiting all possibility of judgment and analysis). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to argue for the philosophical reasons why, Wittgenstein's private language argument would tell us that there is no locus of meaning in private experience, meaning resides in the public realm and is determined by use. So although I can experience this building and take in all the raw sense data, I can also form propositional statements as to its composition and meaning within the already established realm of public discourse. We reserve a sense of judgment of our experiences of architecture so that if one in this case were to claim that the Convention Center design was based on classical Palladian architecture, we would have a right to question that claim.

The Parc de la Villette by Bernard Tschumi, the well-known forerunner of deconstructionist architecture and marked by the oppositional pair of reason/madness, avoids representationalism in its Follies.



However, these red structures are not entirely semantically neutral. The imaginative perception of the observer may layer on additional meanings to these structures, whether one would identify the experience as being like Russian Constructivist architecture, industrial whimsies, grids of erector set construction or other imagined meanings behind them. Like Eisenman's weak resemblances, Tschumi's non-hierarchical, non-representational design purposely allows for shifting readings of these structures. It is the work of the perceiver's imaginative experience in this park to create patterns of recognition from these follies, which are purposely fragmented and thin in semantic meaning. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the designer couldn't avoid the signature of his imprint in

the design, however vague he may have intended it. The common color of red structures and three-dimensional grids already set up a sense of intentionality from which meanings are invited.

As an example of an urban nature, in Roland Barthes, in "Semiology and the Urban", discusses the perception of "objective" maps to our experience of the urban: "there is a last conflict between signification and reality itself. . . the reality of maps. Surveys directed by psycho-sociologists have shown, for example, that two neighborhoods are adjoining, if we rely on the map, which means on the 'real', on objectivity, while, from the moment when they receive two different significations, they are radically separated in the image of the city. Signification, therefore, is experienced as in complete opposition to objective data."<sup>19</sup> Why is this so? Could it be in certain cases that the perceptions (i.e. the pure sense data) one receives are colored by the imaginative experience, as in Wittgenstein's triangle puzzle above, where the raw sense data is overlaid with other influences, be it memory traces or change of visual aspect? Whereas on a map view what is a close proximity may be experienced in a completely different way by barriers, be they physical such as freeways, train tracks, or whether they are sociological or perceptual. Barthes also implies from the example above that the more powerful influence is not the objective 'real' map but the signification our experience, which relates to the imagination, provides.

Martin Heidegger's phenomenological approach to architecture (and life) sought to erase the alienation of contemporary existence between being and thought, a condition that arose by the privileging of technology and calculative thinking. What was sought was a return to an authentic existence as a first-person experience of dwelling rather than the detachment of rational analysis of a condition in the world. A criticism of this approach is that it cuts itself off from the ability to communicate propositional content. "Some ways of expressing the idea of a phenomenology of perception are intolerably Cartesian. That is to say, they employ that the results of phenomenology

are results that I establish for myself alone, and which I cannot verify in the experience of others. . . . It is only what is publicly accessible that can be publicly described, and it is only what is publicly accessible that is important: nothing else, I should like to argue, can make any difference to our lives.”<sup>20</sup> The architects who followed in the phenomenological approach to architecture did not concern themselves so much with the signs and meanings their buildings conveyed as much as the experience the architecture provided and the expression of its essential nature. As Christian Norberg-Schulz has said after Heidegger, “architecture brings something into presence; it is not representational.”<sup>21</sup> In *Building, Dwelling, Thinking* Heidegger gives the example of a bridge. When a bridge is built it doesn’t just sit there as an isolated object but there is a sense that the “bridge gathers the earth to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals. . . . Thus the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge.”<sup>22</sup> But what if instead we were to use a Wittgensteinian theory of mind approach to Heidegger’s example? In what sense does the creation of a bridge “gather?” When Heidegger explains that the bridge doesn’t just connect banks that are already there, but that “The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream,” could we not say that the idea of the banks *emerging as* is actually an event that takes place in the experience of the subject rather than as a physical fact in the world? Is it not the fact that the emergent relationships and connections between bridge, banks, earth and sky are conceptual structures in the imagination of the perceiver? Let’s analyze this process of the bridge. I approach a bridge over a river and see the two banks connected to it, one on my side and one on the other side of the bridge. My sense perception describes the visual field of view from which I take in the various objects mentioned. This sense perception is the raw data and is also the realm of the phenomena. Here I have private access to the sensory realm of the place where I stand. Heidegger’s idea of the ‘gathering’ of the banks being pulled in by the bridge into a newly emergent ‘place’ is not a condition


of the physical objects but it is a held mental conception of relationships among the various elements. Relationship is not a physical thing as much as it is a conceptual understanding of things in certain arrangements and connectedness. Heidegger's sense of achieving an "authenticity" here is essentially the state where one engages their conceptual or imaginative perception to see or 'read' these emergent patterns in a unified way, although we get the impression from Heidegger's writings that the opposite is happening, that an attempt is being made to strip away the cognitive in order to arrive at a more direct experience of the place and hence a more authentic way of dwelling in the world.

To use another example, Schulz discusses the idea of threshold and boundary: "In a building the threshold separates and also unites an outside and inside, it is a gathering middle where an outlook on the world is opened up and set back on earth."<sup>23</sup> A threshold in a building has the dual effect of separating inside and outside but also being a device that unites the same. This apparent contradiction here presented in prose that conveys an aura of the profound (or in Adorno's satire, the "jargon of authenticity") can be more rationally described as a way of perceptual imagination applied one way (as separator) and then again as another (as uniter). It is in the fact that there is available a will to choose to see it a certain way that Heidegger's writings achieve force—he is able to direct a certain way of perceiving architecture through the process of imaginative perception/experience. Those that choose to perceive it in this way can be said to have joined a class attaining to a certain level of authenticity. Indeed the richness of the poetic language of Heidegger that has proven very influential in architectural and artistic realms is functionally dependent upon the analytic concept of imaginative experience.

As we saw in the description above, phenomenologists desire to bring back the first person experience of architecture. This does occur in any imaginative experience of architecture as we saw. But we also saw how propositional attitudes can accompany our imaginative experiences of

architecture. And these propositions create a means of third-person accessibility to our experiences, allowing for judgments of taste.

This propositional content does allow us to discuss the ideas of signification, representation, and meaning in architecture to the extent that these have relevance to the architecture. The folding in of propositional states to our experience contributes to its richness, but the content of our imagination is non-epistemic; I cannot learn anything from the content of my imagination in the way I can receive information from the world by perception. The 'slippage' of meaning in architecture as interpreted by the observer is not negated. Saussure was wrong to locate associative meaning in the brain rather than in the social structure. Associations (the paradigmatic axis) do not establish meaning but it is rather that meaning establishes associations. Saussure's sign that unites the signifier with the signified breaks down in its inability to connect the word relations into the world (as opposed to the conceptual realm). In his diagram below, 'tree' is the signifier and 'arbor' is the signified. The sign unites the signified with the signifier but the problem is that the signified is a concept and not the actual physical object of the tree.



This is the primary criticism of the phenomenologists against structuralism and is evidenced in their focus on the 'essence' of the object in the world as experienced in a more 'direct' manner. However, contrary to both structuralism and phenomenology, meaning is first public and is established by use



according to Wittgenstein's system and illustrated in his private language argument. Private associations (the realm of phenomenology) are beyond the scope of meaning.<sup>24</sup>

I believe there is value in the explorations and observations that have occurred both in structuralism and phenomenology and even in the valid criticisms posited by post (neo)-structuralism. We should remember the tendency in the history of theoretical discourse has been to erase the prior prevailing theory and declare it a past movement while moving on with the new theory/movement. However, there are areas of continuing significance in these three theoretical schools of thought as well as further development and refinement of each of them. While phenomenology has been more antithetical to structuralism, post-structuralism (more aptly called neo-structuralism as it is referred to in the European Continent) has continued on the same foundation of structuralism even while pointing out its problems.

The role of imagination in architectural experience as first seriously considered with Kant and then with Wittgenstein, gives us a framework whereby we may continue to use analytic tools and objective data while also recognizing the important role experience plays in our understanding of architecture.

In summary, the project of semiology sought to assign truth-value to architectural form by the means of linguistic methodology. While phenomenology took a completely different path, not in the analytic realm but in direct world experience, the post-structuralists sought to undermine the structuralist account from within and to strip the object of any one true interpretation. The history of twentieth century architectural expressions along with their accompanying theories does seem to bear out the point that the real use of architectural theory has not been to arrive at or describe truth but to convey a position and a filter from which to mirror their position in the world. As Ed Winter writes, "The intellectual concern of the artists, as these show up in the various works in the various

modalities, form the filter through which we come to see the work under view...theory is not to be seen as aiming at truth, but rather, as being contained within the work as a filter through which we come to understand the artist's motives, concerns, and intentions."<sup>25</sup>

Wittgenstein's theory of mind as here applied in imaginative experience I believe gives us a theoretical bridge between these branches in which to understand how we experience architecture and derive the meaning we do from it. Although it does use methods that are from the analytic school of philosophy and allows us to use semiological methods where applicable, it does address the central role that experience has in our understanding of architecture and acknowledges the rich works in theory and architecture that are phenomenologically based. It also acknowledges some of the claims of post-structuralism, namely the deferral of meaning and the signifier's dependence upon other signifiers.

We saw how imaginative perception is the faculty that processes our sense perception of architecture from the disparate fragments of visual data and unifies it into an ordered whole that we can understand and give meaning to. This imaginative sense does not replace the object we perceive, but brings in (to use Wittgenstein's words) the imaging in "another dimension" as it were, layered over the objective perception. Our sense perception of the world brings in the objective data from which we gain knowledge of the world while the imaginative sense does not add any new empirical data, only our interpretation of the raw data received through our senses. Although I have focused on the visual sense in this paper, this could also be applied to our other senses used in experiencing architecture such as the haptic and the auditory. This theory then acts as a mediator between the rational and experiential methods of knowing architecture, allowing us to continue to explore analytic relationships and propositional statements while also engaging in the experience of architecture from which we as individuals derive aesthetic pleasure of the work. I believe it achieves a higher stance or

perspective from which to frame our theories of semiology, phenomenology and post-structuralism;  
both enabling us to use relevant ideas from each of them and to provide a conceptual thread that ties  
the salient elements of these theories together.

Footnotes

1. Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1979), 74.
2. Edward Winters, "Architecture," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Nigel Gaut and Dominic Lopes, (London; New York, Routledge, 2005), 1978.
3. Roland Barthes, "Semiology and The Urban," in *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory*, ed. Neil Leach, (New York, Routledge, 1997), 168-169.
4. Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, 75.
5. Winters, "Architecture," 120.
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York, Macmillan. 1953), ii hxi.
7. Winters, "Architecture," 120.
8. Winters, "Architecture," 110.
9. Winters, "Architecture," 115.
10. Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, 75.
11. Winters, "Architecture," 117.
12. Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, 90.
13. Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, 95.
14. R.K. Elliott and Paul Crowther, *Aesthetics, Imagination and the Unity of Experience* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub, 2006), 36.
15. Elliott, *Aesthetics, Imagination and the Unity of Experience*, 39.
16. Elliott, *Aesthetics, Imagination and the Unity of Experience*, 40.
17. Elliott, *Aesthetics, Imagination and the Unity of Experience*, 40.

18. Jeffrey Kipnis, "Toward a New Architecture." *AD: Folding and Pliancy* (Academy Editions, London, 1993), 107.
19. Barthes, "Semiology and The Urban," 168.
20. Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture*, 78.
21. Christian Norberg-Schulz, "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture," in *Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory, 1965-1995*. ed. Kate Nesbitt, 1st ed. (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 429.
22. Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," 104-105.
23. Norberg-Schulz, "Heidegger's Thinking on Architecture," 437.
24. Winters, "Architecture," 126.

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